A market consisting of a generator with thermal and renewable generation capability, a set of non-preemptive loads (i.e., loads which cannot be interrupted once started), and an independent system operator (ISO) is considered. Loads are characterized by durations, power demand rates and utility for receiving service, as well as disutility functions giving preferences for time slots in which service is preferred. Given this information, along with the generator's thermal generation cost function and forecast renewable generation, the social planner solves a mixed integer program to determine a load activation schedule which maximizes social welfare. Assuming price taking behavior, we develop a competitive equilibrium concept based on a relaxed version of the social planner's problem which includes prices for consumption and incentives for flexibility, and allows for probabilistic allocation of power to loads. Considering each load as representative of a population of identical loads with scaled characteristics, we demonstrate that the relaxed social planner's problem gives an exact solution to the original mixed integer problem in the large population limit, and give a market mechanism for implementing the competitive equilibrium.
horizon. The social planner is tasked with serving these loads has access to a thermal generator with convex generation cost, as well as a renewable generator with zero marginal cost. Given the users' preferences, thermal generator's cost function, and knowledge of the renewable generator's output, the scheduler determines an efficient schedule in the sense of cost minimization.
We seek to answer the following questions: How can these flexible loads be scheduled over the available time slots? Once a schedule has been determined, how should users be compensated for their flexibility? What is the "price of inflexibility" in this setting?
Our main results are as follows. We first give mixed binary optimization problems for the non-preemptive loads, a profit maximizing thermal generator, and an independent system operator (ISO), which is tasked with ensuring supply/demand balance.
We then consider the convex relaxations of the load and ISO problems, and formulate a centralized welfare maximization problem in order to study efficiency properties of market outcomes. We then prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium for this setting, i.e., we show that there exist prices for per unit energy consumption and inflexibility such that the thermal generator produces efficient levels at each time step, and the LSE schedules loads such that demand equals supply while respecting the loads' flexibility preferences. Finally, we establish fundamental theorems of welfare economics for the decentralized setting.
Related work. [2] examines a setting similar to the one presented here in continuous time. Prices for load consumption and inflexibility are derived as dual variables to the scheduler's convex optimization problem, and a competitive equilibrium with respect to reported loads reported consumption level and duration is studied. The paper also studies a discretized time setting, and describes approximately optimal scheduling and pricing heuristics. More recently, [5] details a power exchange platform allowing for random arrivals of buy and sell orders, as well as flexible consumers. A fluid relaxation of the discrete time flexible scheduling problem together with a projection method for deriving a feasible schedule is presented, and the fluid solution shown to be optimal asymptotically as the number of flexible consumers tends to infinity. Marginal pricing, given a schedule of the flexible loads is shown to be inadmissable with respect to incoming offers, and modification for the nonconvex discrete time scheduling problem is left to future work. [1] studies the scheduling and pricing of deadline differentiated loads, wherein the longer a consumer is willing to defer, the lower the price in energy they will pay. The derived pricing scheme is shown to yield a competitive equilibrium between the consumers and supplier and, when used in tandem with earliest-deadline-first scheduling, is incentive compatible in terms of reported deadlines.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The market consists of M non-preemptive loads (or consumers) and a single thermal generator. Additionally, an ISO (independent system operator) ensures safe grid operation. Let T = [1, . . . , T ] denote the discrete time horizon over which loads are scheduled and served. For simplicity, we assume a single bus network model. We assume throughout that all entities are price taking, i.e., their actions do not affect market prices.
where τ i gives the duration in time slots, l i gives the consumption level, and u dS i· and u dE i· give the disutility functions of consumer i due to service starting prior to or after a desired service window, respectively. That is, consumer i demands l i MW of electricity for τ i consecutive time slots, and derives utility U i as their load is fulfilled. Figure 1 plots an example pair of disutility functions vectors.Thus, the consumer's overall utility is a function of the flexibility that it allows for in the scheduling of its load.
We will similarly define vector and matrix valued quantities throughout. Given flexibility incentives p S i ∈ R T + and p E i ∈ R T + , consumer i solves the following optimization problem:
If x C it = 1, then consumer i chooses to start their load service at time slot t and pay price p con it . The inner sums on the left hand side in constraints (1) and (2) give the on/off status of load i at each time slot s. The term (1 − y C it ) = 1 when load i has been activated prior to or at time slot t. In such a case, load i incurs disutility u dS it ≥ 0 for having started by time t, but is compensated p S it . Similarly, (1 − z C it ) = 1 indicates that load i will be active at or after time slot t, with u dE it and p E it analogous to u dS it and p S it . The generator is characterized by its thermal generation cost function c(·) : R + → R + , which is assumed to be strictly convex, increasing and twice differentiable on R + . In addition to the generator's thermal plant, we assume that it also owns a renewable generator which produces energy at zero marginal cost. The output of the renewable generator, g : T → (0, ∞) is assumed to be known at time t = 0. Given prices p gen ∈ R T + , the generator chooses generation levels q G ∈ R T + to solve the following profit maximization problem
Finally, the ISO determines the set of admissible load and generation schedules by solving
A. The Social Planner's Problem
In order to study the welfare properties of the competitive equilibrium given later, we introduce a social planning problem.
The social planner is concerned with the combined welfare of all market participants. Specifically, the social planner collects the profiles of each load i, and schedules them so that each is served without interruption for their entire duration. Letx it ∈ {0, 1}
denote the social planner's decision as to whether load i will begin service in time slot t, wherex it = 1 denotes that load i will start at time slot t. A schedule is then defined asx ∈ {0, 1} M ×T . The social planner selects a schedule, auxiliary load status variablesŷ andẑ, and corresponding generation levelsq := (q 1 , . . . ,q t ) in order to solve the following problem
T s=t s r=max{1,s−τi+1}x
In order to develop prices for electricity consumption and load inflexibility, as well as a competitive equilibrium concept, we relax the binary constraints onx,ŷ andẑ, and consider the following problem:
It can be shown that constraints (7) and (8) ensure that all entries ofx,ŷ andẑ are less than 1, and also that
Under relaxation, since in addition to (9), eachx it satisfies 0 ≤x it ≤ 1, it can be interpreted as a probability that a given load of type i will be scheduled at time slot t, i.e., that the planner will choosex i· ∈ R T equal to e t , the T th standard basis vector. Therefore,x in (SPP-R) gives a probabilistic schedule for the loads and if, for a given i, (9) holds with equality, then load i is certain to be activated at some point. Otherwise, the load is only has a chance of being activated during the horizon T . Fixing a matrix of probabilitiesx, (1 −ŷ it ) and (1 −ẑ it ) give probabilities that load i has been activated up to time t, and will be active from time slot t onward, respectively. Consequently, the (SPP-R) objective may be viewed as the expectation of overall social welfare, and the constraints as being met in expectation. This interpretation is key to the competitive equilibrium definition and properties we detail in later sections.
Note that due to the nonnegativity of u dS it and u dE it for all i, t, for any fixedx, it is always optimal to choose each entry of (1 −ŷ) and (1 −ẑ) as small as possible. Therefore constraints (7) and (8) may be replaced with equalities, and matricesŷ andẑ are completely determined given a particularx.
Problem (SPP-R) has Lagrangian
Let
See Appendix A for the derivation of pλ and pν. The (SPP-R) Lagrangian can be rearranged as
and in addition to feasibility, the KKT conditions for (SPP-R) are
B. Consumer's Problem
The second (SPP-R) Lagrangian expression (12) suggests the following decomposition of the relaxed social planner's problem into relaxed versions of the individual entity problems presented above. Starting with the consumer problems, we have
The optimality conditions for (CON-R i ) are
where p θ * it is defined analogously to pν it in (11). Again, under the relaxation on the binary constraints on x C i , y C i and z C i , we may interpret the consumer's problem as selecting probabilities of activation for each time slot t, in the interest of maximizing their expected net utility (here written in minimization form).
C. Generator and ISO Problems
The generator's problem remains the same as before
with optimality conditions
Finally, the relaxed ISO problem is given by
where p p gen it and p α * it are defined analogously to pλ it in (11). Note that (38)-(41) and can always be satisfied by choosing α * t = p gen
III. COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM AND THEOREMS OF WELFARE ECONOMICS
We now give our competitive equilibrium definition, and explore existence, as well as welfare properties of such an equilibrium.
Definition 1: (Competitive Equilibrium). A tuple (q * , x * , y * , z * , p con * , p S * , p E * , p gen * ) with p gen * ≥ 0 is said to be a competitive equilibrium if, given (p con *
given p gen* , q * solves (GEN-R), and given p gen * , (q * , x * ) solves (ISO-R).
As noted in the previous section since solutions to (CON-R i ) will, in general, give values of x C it ∈ [0, 1], the quantities (x * , y * , z * ) in the competitive equilibrium in definition 1 have probabilistic interpretations: consumers select probabilities x C it of being scheduled at each time slot t ∈ T , in order to maximize their expected net utility.
Our first result addresses the existence of the competitive equilibrium defined above.
Theorem 1: There exists a competitive equilibrium, given by an optimal solution to (SPP-R), (q * ,x * ,ŷ * ,ẑ * ), and the following prices derived from an optimal dual solution to (SPP-R)
for all i and t.
Proof 1: Given price selections according to (44), and selecting q G = q I =q * , x C i = x I i =x * i for all i, y C i =ŷ * i and z C i =ẑ * i for all i makes the collected optimality conditions (aside from feasibility) for (CON-R i ) for each i, (GEN-R) and (ISO-R)
Further selecting θ S * it = θ E * it = 0 for all i and t gives
These expressions are identical to the (SPP-R) KKT conditions, and therefore satisfied by optimal solutions to (SPP-R). As a primal solution to (SPP-R), (x * ,ŷ * ,ẑ * ) also satisfies the collected constraints from (CON-R i ) for each i, (GEN-R) and
(ISO-R).
While solutions to (SPP-R) yield competitive equilibria, the converse holds true as well, given in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2: Any competitive equilibrium forms an optimal solution for (SPP-R).
Proof 2: By definition, the competitive equilibrium (q * , x * , y * , z * , p con * , p S * , p E * , p gen * ) satisfies
for some θ S * , θ E * and α * ≥ 0, as well as the feasibility conditions for each of the individual entity problems. Therefore, observing that for any p gen * ≥ 0 the form of the objective in (ISO-R) ensures that complementary slackness condition (23) will be satisfied at the competitive equilibrium, selecting (q * ,x * ,ŷ * ,ẑ * ) = (q * , x * , y * , z * ) as the primal variables, and dual variablesλ * = p gen * = α * and (ν S * it ,ν E * it ) = (p S * /τ i + θ S * it , p E * /τ i + θ E * it ) for all i, t, forms optimal primal and dual solutions to (SPP-R).
IV. REPLICATED AND LARGE ECONOMIES
Note that in general a competitive equilibrium doesn't exist when the social planner's problem is a mixed integer programming problem. Nevertheless, our definition of competitive equilibrium allows for probabilistic allocation to consumers, and thus the competitive equilibrium existence is related to the existence of a primal and dual solution to the (relaxed) (SPP-R) problem.
In this section we justify the study of this relaxed problem by demonstrating its equivalence to the original, binary constrained (SPP) when each load i is interpreted as representing an infinite population of identical loads, with scaled demand.
Suppose that each load i is replicated N times, and that the resulting loads have demand, utility and disutility scaled by N .
Indexing the replicas of each type i with the index n, the binary constrained SPP with N replication is
We refer to the problem with N replication which relaxes the binary constraint onx as SPP(N )-R (instead of SPP(1)-R, we will still refer to the original relaxed problem as SPP-R). When we wish to emphasize the dependence of decision variables on the replication factor N , we will append (N ), e.g.x int (N ).
Proposition 3: Let (q * ,x * ,ŷ * ,ẑ * ,λ * ,ν S * ,ν E * ) denote an optimal solution to SPP-R. Then for any N , an optimal solution to SPP(N )-R can be formed by settingx
The proof of the theorem follows from making the selections specified in the theorem statement, substituting into (89)-(100), and comparing with (13)-(24).
While Proposition 3 states that an optimal probabilistic schedulex * (N ) in the problem with N replication can be derived from an optimal probabilistic schedulex * for (SPP-R) and specifies how to do so, in the limit as N → ∞ we can usex to generate an optimal deterministic, binary constrained schedule if we interpretx * it as the proportion of the population of type i to be activated at time t. This is stated formally in the following theorem.
Theorem 4: An optimal solution to SPP(∞) is given by activating proportionx * it of type i population at time t for each i and t, wherex * is an optimal solution to SPP-R.
Proof 4: Note that constraints (87) and (88) may be rewritten
so that overall SPP(N ) can be written as
Now, ifx int (N ) is considered as a Bernoulli random variable with P (x int (N ) = 1) =x * it andq * t (N ) is chosen asq * t (1) =q t for all t, then by the Law of Large Numbers, constraint (105) converges to
Similarly, the objective function converges to
Since the optimal objective of the relaxed problem provides a lower bound for the binary constrained problem, and the power balance constraint is satisfied in the limit as N → ∞, the solution produced by randomly activating loads according tox * converges to an optimal binary constrained solution as N → ∞.
V. MARKET MECHANISM FOR LARGE POPULATION ECONOMY
The competitive equilibrium definition given in the previous section allows for non-binary activation schedule x * . As mentioned, since 0 ≤ x * it ≤ 1, and t x * it ≤ 1, each x * it may be interpreted as giving the portion of load i activated at time t under relaxation of the binary constraints on the activation schedule or, alternatively, the probability that an individual load of type i in the infinite replication setting is fully activated at time t.
Let us explore the infinitely replicated setting from the perspective of an individual load n of type i. First, note that (SPP(N )-R) has Lagrangian
Thus, under N replication and relaxation, the optimization problem for consumer n of type i is given by
Multiplying by N , the (CON in (N )-R) objective function can be written as
As in Theorem 1, set
and as in Proposition 3, choosê
This implies that
Therefore, posing the prices described in Proposition 3 in the limit as N → ∞, the objective functions for each (CON in )
Thus, the pricing facing each load of type i is identical, and in fact the problem facing each is the same as the single load of type i in the decomposition with relaxation but not replication. Further, each will select the same
gives the probability that the load will be scheduled at time t. The following mechanism (FLEX-SCHED(N )) uses the probability values selected by the continuum of consumers to generate a binary constrained schedule in the setting with N replication. Note that since the generator's problem does not involve consumer utility and disutility functions, nor consumer scheduling variables, its problem is not affected by replication (or relaxation). Therefore (GEN(N ) ) is the same as (GEN) for all N , including N = ∞ . 1) Each consumer (i, n) submits u dS i· and u dE i· , and the generator submits c to the social planner. 2) The social planner solves (SPP-R), and announces (p con * , p S * , p E * , p gen * , p bal * ) as specified in Theorem 1.
3) Each consumer i solves (CON(∞)-R in ), the generator solves (GEN(∞)), and (x * i , y * i , z * i ) for all i, as well as q * are submitted to the ISO.
4) The ISO randomly assigns proportion x * i of loads of type i to start at time t, for each i and t. The generator produces q * over the finite horizon. Combined with the renewable generation output g, this generated power is allocated to the consumers according to x * i and demands l i for each i.
In the large population setting, the following result regarding (FLEX-SCHED(∞)) holds.
Theorem 5: The mechanism (FLEX-SCHED(∞)) is ex-post individually rational, budget balanced and efficient.
Proof 5: Let us denote realizations of the randomized scheduled specified by x * asx, and similarly for other variables.
Starting with ex-post individual rationality, suppose that for some i we have that t x * it < 1, so that a portion of population i will not be activated. Thenx int = 0 for all t, andỹ int =z int = 1 for all t, so that the objective of (CON(∞)-R in ), i.e., the realized net utility of load n of type i is equal to 0.
In all other cases, load n of type i is scheduled, so that for somet in where (SPP-R) KKT conditions (15) and (16) are satisfied,x int = 1. Due to constraints (109) and (110), in (CON(∞)-R in ), we have that
Substitutingx,ỹ andz and the equilibrium prices from step 2 of (FLEX-SCHED) into expression (111) gives
The term pλ * itin + pν * itin − U i is equal to 0 due to (SPP-R) KKT conditions (15) and (16) and the fact thatt is a time index wherex it > 0. The terms in the sums are nonpositive due to (SPP-R) KKT conditions (19) and (21). Thus, each user will incur nonnegative net utility when participating in the mechanism, regardless of whether or not they are scheduled.
In this context, budget balance is achieved if
Selecting x C int = x * it =x * it = for all n, and
the right hand side of (115) is equal to
From the definition of pλ * it and the power balance constraint (6) in (SPP-R), the left term in (117) is equal to
From the definition of pν * it and the flexibility constraints (7) and (8), the right term in (117) is equal to 
Summing the last expressions in (118) and (119) gives the left hand side of (115), showing that budget balance holds at the competitive equilibrium. Finally, the mechanism is efficient by Theorem 4, as it randomly activates loads of type i according tox * it .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we study how to schedule and price service for a population of flexible, but non-preemptive loads, in the presence of renewable generation, as well as a dispatchable thermal generator. Formulating a collection of mixed integer optimization programs for the consumers, and generator, we then study a centralized version of our setting, where the integer constraints, allowing for use of Lagrangian analysis and derivation of prices. A solution of this centralized problem yields a competitive equilibrium, and conversely a competitive equilibrium yields an efficient solutions.
There are several directions for future work in this area. First, in terms of the scheduling aspect, it is desirable to determine a method for deriving at least an approximately optimal solution to the original integer constrained setting, given an efficient solution to the relaxed social planner's problem presented here. In terms of pricing, properties such as fairness should be examined. For example, assuming that the disutility functions of each user can be at least partially ordered from less to more restrictive, is the compensation offered to more flexible users more than to those which are not as flexible? It will also be of interest to explore other types of loads, such as those which may be interrupted, as well as those which might accept less than an upper bound of total energy delivered. Strategic behavior amongst market participants should also be taken into account, as well as more detailed network modeling and constraints. 
